The Iran war has spurred strong interest in creating alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz. In a note sent to CNBC in mid-July, Goldman Sachs identified seven pipeline projects that aim to mitigate Iran’s ability to restrict hydrocarbon exports.

By 2028, Goldman Sachs estimates that pipeline expansions could handle 60% of the Gulf states’ pre-war oil exports, CNBC reports. But the news network cautions that these pipelines, like the strait itself, would be vulnerable to relatively low-cost attacks.

As a case in point, the network cites an incident in early April in which Iran attacked a pumping station on Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which links crude oil processing facilities to export terminals on the Red Sea. The resulting damage cut throughput by 700,000 barrels a day.

Citing Jennifer Li, a geopolitical analyst at Rystad Energy, CNBC suggests the pipelines are “more of a geopolitical hedge against disruptions in Hormuz than a replacement for the strait.”

Three Ways Out

Even if pipelines could escape sabotage, it would be beneficial for the conflict to end sooner rather than later. Unfortunately, every option available to end the war comes with downsides, says Michael Froman, president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

“The choice now before President Donald Trump may be to pick between the lesser of three unattractive options: a dramatic escalation, a conciliatory deescalation, and a continuation of today’s messy stalemate,” he outlines.

Regarding the first option, Froman sees three ways the United States could escalate the conflict. First, it could attack Iran’s critical infrastructure, including its oil and gas facilities, power plants, and desalination facilities, to place even greater pressure on the country’s economy and society.

“The cruel logic of this approach is obvious, and we have avoided it for good reason,” Froman writes. “Strikes of this nature could cause a humanitarian crisis in Iran, stain the United States’ moral standing, and would by no means guarantee capitulation from the regime. That is to say nothing of the Pandora’s box that a ‘total war’ might open, placing the Gulf states’ critical infrastructure, energy and power facilities, civilian population centers, as well as desalination plants at the top of Iran’s target list.”

Alternatively, Trump could deploy soldiers to seize Iran’s oil export terminals and gain control of the land surrounding the strait. “Such operations would put thousands of U.S. warfighters and prized naval assets at risk,” Froman notes.

The final military escalation involves resuming attacks on Iran’s leadership. “But the regime has proved remarkably adept at replenishing itself, if not stiffening its resolve, in the wake of such strikes,” he cautions.

Instead of escalating the conflict, Froman says the United States could deescalate the conflict. “The United States could significantly scale back its military presence, declare victory (again) with respect to most of Operation Epic Fury’s stated military objectives, and accept—at least to some degree—Iran’s grip on the Strait of Hormuz,” he clarifies.

While polling suggests that 68% of Americans consider the war “not worth fighting,” Froman says unilateral deescalation “would be hard to sell politically.”

“If the United States were to implement the provisions of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding as written, Iran would remain in a position to continue to choke off the Strait of Hormuz at will—or at least charge a toll for passage while kicking down the road any real discussion of unresolved issues around its nuclear program. A unilateral deescalation would also shatter the confidence of our partners in the region—not to mention partners elsewhere—in the United States as a trustworthy guarantor of security,” Froman assesses.

“Suffice it to say that both the escalatory and deescalatory options before Trump are unappealing. That is why he has understandably tried to chart a middle course: a tit-for-tat strategy of strikes and new deal offers playing out simultaneously in the military and diplomatic domains. But it remains to be seen whether this approach is likely to succeed on either front.”

Sound Logic

The idea of firing missiles at a country while trying to negotiate peace with it seems counterintuitive to many.

“Every time one side shoots, commentators declare negotiations dead,” writes Emily Harding, director of the Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, as well as vice president of its defense and security department. “They are wrong. For both sides, fighting at the same time as they are talking, or “talk-fight,” is the most effective way to advance their interests. Paradoxically, it is likely also the fastest path to peace.”

To explain why, Harding contrasts talk-fight with the traditional conception of negotiations, which envisions diplomats spending weeks or months convincing the parties involved in the conflict to agree to a ceasefire. Ideally, this temporary peace will give them an opportunity to negotiate a permanent agreement.

This process can be extremely slow. “Months are eaten up by discussions over preconditions and negotiating about negotiations,” Harding explains. “In one infamous example, the parties in the Vietnam War spent 10 weeks arguing over the shape of the table for the Paris talks.”

Complicating matters, ceasefires frequently prove temporary. “A rogue actor attempting to undermine negotiations, third party intervention, or a miscommunication or mistake can lead to renewed fighting,” Harding warns.

It doesn’t help that in many conflicts, neither side has a strong incentive to seek a ceasefire. “The side with momentum on the battlefield hardly wants to squander it. And the other side that is losing often wants to keep fighting to achieve an elusive ‘position of strength’ from which to negotiate,” Harding says.

The result is a “talk-fight” situation like the one between the United States and Iran. “Politics continues by both means simultaneously—war and conversation. Parties communicate with violence and also with diplomats. The violence demonstrates political will, displeasure, and positioning for additional concessions. The talking seeks acceptable ground for an end—a real end—to the fighting.”

By continuing to attack Iran, Trump “is signaling U.S. resolve and overwhelming military might, and he is attempting to force Iran to bow to superior firepower with concessions.” Meanwhile, Iran “wants to remind the world that it can shut down the Strait of Hormuz any time it chooses and signal that time is in its favor. It wants to use that leverage to get the most favorable terms possible.”

Harding says Iran has a reputation for being difficult to negotiate with. “It has the patience to outwait its counterparts, the domestic power to ignore the suffering of its people, and a track record of winning negotiations,” she explains.

Real Costs

While “talk-fight” may be pragmatic, Harding acknowledges that it comes with real costs and risks.

“Clearly, violence is far worse than peace for the affected population,” she notes. “In this case, the casualty count is relatively low, but too many have been civilians. Further, the global economy is suffering paroxysms of uncertainty from every wave of violence. War may send a strong message, but for the people, it is a destroyer of worlds.”

Both parties could also misjudge each other. If Iran’s attacks go too far, it could provoke the United States to make good on its threats to destroy military-adjacent infrastructure such as bridges, oil facilities, and export terminals, which would cripple Iran’s economy for years to come.

Meanwhile, the United States could underestimate the regime’s ability to endure attacks. “For the Iranian regime, at least a perception that it won is essential to survival,” Harding assesses. “It cares little if the global economy suffers—after all, thanks to a decades-long comprehensive sanctions regime, Iran is largely cut off from the global financial system anyway. Iran could very well outwait the United States, eager to see it sink money and munitions into this conflict.”

Even so, Harding says commentators often overstate the possibility of escalation. While both parties view fighting as a means to communicate, she says they also have incentives to limit the conflict.

“Negotiations should continue with a stubborn resolve to be immune to disruption,” she predicts. “These parties in particular will claw for advantage both at and away from the table, and both believe violence is a legitimate tool. The fastest way to achieve a real peace for the people of the Gulf and relative economic normalcy for the world is to talk on, no matter what.”

Duration

Froman, the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, seems to concur that the mix of negotiations and strikes will continue. “Given the perils of a significantly more dovish or hawkish approach, the current conflict in the strait may become the new status quo,” he says.

But how long will it last? “The astrophysicist J. Richard Gott offered an infamous rule of thumb: absent better information, the odds are even that a phenomenon will endure at least as long as it already has,” Froman said in late July. “By that grim arithmetic, the five-month-old stalemate in the strait stands an even chance of grinding on through the end of this year. And every month it continues, its odds of surviving the next only improve.

“If you don’t find that logic persuasive, there are always the prediction markets,” he continues. “Expectations there put a 50 percent chance on commercial vessel traffic in the Strait of Hormuz ‘returning to normal’ (a proxy for the end of conflict) by the end of 2026—basically aligning the wisdom of crowds with a Princeton astrophysicist.”